

Reducing Data Erasure Latency via Storage-side Encryption



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

Introduction

Logical deletion leaves SSD data forensically recoverable, and overwriting is $O(n)$. We propose a format-aware selective crypto-erase: one key per file, so deleting a file means wiping a single key — an $O(1)$ operation, verified against a worst-case forensic adversary.

Why Progressive JPEG

Progressive JPEG is widely deployed across web and image-delivery pipelines, where its frequency-ordered scans render images coarse-to-fine. Because recognizability is concentrated in the leading low-frequency scans, encrypting this compact, locatable region renders the entire image unrecoverable — making a prevalent format also an efficient target for selective crypto-erase.


progressive JPEG bitstream (frequency-ordered) →



The unit of SSD Write is 4KB.
DC partially retained!

How Little Can We Encrypt?

Forensic Image Recovery — DC-From-AC via Poisson Iteration




Parameter	Value (Rigorous)
Secure cutoff — image	forensic correlation (r) < 0.30
Poisson iterations	1500
Max image side	2048 px
Encryption-ratio sweep	1 – 100 %
Destruction target	≥ 90 % of worst-case images
Text-secure cutoff — documents only	OCR char-recovery < 0.10

Destruction = similarity of recovered image to original



$$\text{Image (photo)} \quad r = \frac{\sum (x_i - \bar{x})(y_i - \bar{y})}{\sqrt{\sum (x_i - \bar{x})^2 \sum (y_i - \bar{y})^2}}$$


Destruction = how much text OCR can still read (worst-case field)



Document Worst-case: secure only if all 4 fields (Amount·Date·Account·Name) < 0.10.

$$\text{Field}_{\text{worst}} = \max_{f \in \{\text{Amount, Date, Account, Name}\}} \left[1 - \frac{\text{Lev}(GT_f, OCR_f)}{\max(|GT_f|, |OCR_f|)} \right] < 0.10$$

One-Key-Per-File Design



Latency Benchmark

Full Write → Read → Erase lifecycle measured on FEMU, swept across 5 image sizes × 6 encryption ratios


Top: NAND W/R + AES encrypt/decrypt tax. Bottom: key delete ≈ 5 μs ($O(1)$) vs overwrite ($O(n)$).



Deletion cost stays constant while data grows

Experimental Results

Image (photo)



Document



SECURE ENCRYPTION RATIO

Photos	60%	forensic correlation < 0.30
Documents	90%	OCR character-recovery < 0.10

Same $O(1)$ crypto-erase cost for both. The higher cost of securing text is paid only in encryption coverage — never in deletion latency.

Demo Videos

